INTRODUCTION
Although Congress and the majority of state legislatures have resisted enacting draconian gun control laws, courts are the final bulwark in safeguarding our constitutional right to keep and bear arms. Yet the courtroom has become the scene of unprecedented attacks as gun control advocates have used the judiciary to make an end-run around the legislative process. Meritless litigation brought by government plaintiffs in multiple jurisdictions are just part of a scheme to force gun makers to adopt policies that legislatures have wisely rejected. Moreover, the politicians use these suits to reward their allies-private attorneys who are often major JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY panies first caved in to the state Medicaid recovery suits. 5 Cigarette manufacturers, besieged by claims in dozens of states and sued under perverted rules of tort law that eliminated any opportunity for an adequate defense, 6 decided to settle. In other words, the companies decided to bribe the politicians instead of going to war against a punitive money grab. That capitulation-the surrender of the industry's right to market a perfectly legal product-predictably spawned a new round of litigation. This time, gun makers were pitted against the combined resources of billionaire trial lawyers, city mayors, county executives, a state attorney general, and the Clinton administration.
In bullying gun makers, the plaintiffs have included three corrosive ingredients carried over from the tobacco wars in their litigation formula: First, they have sued in multiple jurisdictions, thereby escalating the industry's legal costs. Second, they have employed contingency fee lawyers, many of whom were major political donors. Third, they have tried to use the judicial branch in order to bypass the legislature. Contrary to the plaintiffs' arguments that those efforts will reduce gun violence, compelling statistics suggest otherwise-that fewer guns in our society would leave Americans more, not less vulnerable to gun violence.
In Part I of this article, I examine that new litigation para- " [G] iven the perverse legal rules under which the state Medicaid recovery suits were unfolding, the cigarette giants were effectively bludgeoned into negotiating with the states and the trial lawyers." See Robert A. Levy, Joel Klein's Legacy: The Mother of All Antitrust Violations, CATO: TODAY'S COMMENTARY, Oct. 7, 2000 . A Master Settlement Agreement, signed in November 1998 by the major tobacco companies and forty-six state attorneys general, includes a provision requiring non-signing cigarette manufacturers to post pro-rata damages on sales in escrow for twenty-five years to offset any potential liability. Id. NO. 275, June 20, 1997 [hereinafter, Levy, Tobacco Medicaid Litigation] (noting that in the thirty-nine suits brought against the tobacco industry, the states have circumvented the rules of subrogation and have sued the manufacturers directly).
digm. In Part II, I digress briefly to explore Second Amendment concerns. In Part III, I analyze the suits threatened by public housing authorities, the claims by some cities that gun makers are responsible for "negligent marketing," the allegation by other cities that guns are an "unreasonably dangerous" and "defective" product, and the fallout from the Smith & Wesson settlement. Finally, in Part IV, I assess the data that allegedly links gun injuries and crime to gun ownership, and I conclude that the data in fact shows an inverse correlation-i.e., high gun ownership leads to fewer gun injuries and crimes-lending further support to the notion that these lawsuits are entirely meritless.
I. STATE-SPONSORED TORT SUITS: THE NEW PARADIGM
When public officials prosecute lawbreakers, those officials are fulfilling a legitimate role of government. Most of the time, that prosecutorial role is unobjectionable, often commendable. But the latest rounds of litigation dealing with tobacco and then guns are different in three respects, each of which threatens the rule of law.
First, coordinated actions by multiple government entities can impose enormous legal fees on defendants. 7 As a result, those actions have been used to extort money notwithstanding that the underlying case is without merit. 8 For example, former See Robert A. Levy, Spoils of the Tobacco Shakedown: Contingent-Fee Contracts Between State and Private Attorneys Should Be Illegal, TX. LAW, Feb. 15, 1999, at 23 [hereinafter Levy, Spoils of the Tobacco Shakedown] . "The private attorneys who represented Florida, Texas, and Mississippi in litigation against the tobacco industry have made out like bandits, fleecing tobacco companies, smokers, and taxpayers. In December, arbitration panels awarded the lawyers $8.2 billion in legal fees. see also All Things Considered: Tobacco Settlement Attorneys' Fees (NPR radio broadcast, Sept. 25, 2001 ) (reporting that the "law firms who helped secure Michigan's share of the settlement are due $450 million"). 8 Legal commentators, newspaper columnists, and editors alike have used the term "extortion" when discussing and describing suits initiated by cities, states, and the federal government in an effort to target socially unpopular defendants. See, e.g., Robert A. Levy, The New Business of Government Sponsored Litigation, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL 'Y 592, 593 (2000) [hereinafter JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY phia Mayor Edward G. Rendell (D) called for dozens of cities to file concurrent suits against gun makers.
9
Gun manufacturers "don't have the deep pockets of the tobacco industry," Rendell explained, and multiple lawsuits "could bring them to the negotiating table a lot sooner." 10 Never mind that the suits are baseless. We are not dealing with law, but with extortion parading as law.
One effective way to stop that thievery is to implement a "government pays" rule granting a defendant's legal fees when a governmental unit is the losing plaintiff in a civil case. In the criminal sphere, defendants are already entitled to courtappointed counsel if needed; 11 they are also protected by the requirement for proof beyond reasonable doubt and by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution.
12
No corresponding safeguards against abusive public sector litigation exist in civil cases. By limiting the rule to cases involving government plaintiffs, access to the courts is preserved for less affluent, private plaintiffs seeking redress of legitimate grievances. As a result, defendants in government suits will be able to resist meritless cases brought by the state solely to ratchet up the pressure for a large financial settlement.
"Government pays" becomes ever more urgent with the recent emergence of an insidious relationship between the plaintiffs' bar and some government officials. That relationship com-mon to tobacco and gun litigation is a second major threat to the rule of law.
The rounds of litigation against both the tobacco and gun industries were concocted by a handful of private attorneys who entered into contingency fee contracts with the government.
13
In effect, members of the private bar were hired as government subcontractors with a huge financial share in the outcome. Rendell-not believing this to be a problem-announced that cities were suing gun makers for the purposes of improving safety features and changing distribution practices, not for the purpose of receiving monetary damages.
14 Yet one day after Rendell's disclaimer, Miami and Bridgeport filed their suits, seeking hundreds of millions of dollars in damages. 15 New Orleans asked for damages, 16 as did Chicago to the tune of $433 million.
17
The claims included not only medical costs associated with gun violence, but also the costs of police protection, emergency services, police overtime and pensions, courts, prisons, loss of population, cleaning the streets of blood, lower property values, even lost tax revenue from reduced worker productivity 18 -plus punitive damages. And nearly all of the cities have solicited private lawyers to 13 See Levy, Spoils of the Tobacco Shakedown, supra note 7, at 23; Levy, Tobacco Medicaid Litigation, supra note 7 (stating that attorneys involved in the tobacco litigations in Florida, Texas, and Mississippi were awarded $8.2 billion in legal fees). 14 See Nicholas, supra note 9 (asserting that lawsuits filed against gun manufacturers sought to recover costs from gun violence). 15 See Gail Appleson, Two More Cities Sue Gun Makers, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 1999, at A6. 16 See Butterfield, supra note 9, at A16.
Chicago Mayor Richard M. Daley, Remarks at Press Conference (Nov. 12, 1998) . 18 See, e.g., Appleson, supra note 15, at A6; Susan Kimmelman, Stick 'Em Up: Suing Gunmakers for the Cost of Urban Violence, IN THESE TIMES, July 26, 1998, at 13. In 1996 David Kairys, a law professor at Temple University, worked with civic leaders in Philadelphia to craft a lawsuit basing damages on gun cost in terms of police, emergency personnel, public health, courts and prisons. Id. "Kairys writes, 'A city's potential damages can begin with a 911 call, cleaning blood from the street, and emergency medical care, and continue through support of an orphaned child.'" Id. JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY work for a contingency fee based on those damages.
19
If money is not the primary goal of such litigation, a number of attorneys will have worked for free. Maybe that is fitting. After all, the gun suits are not intended to go to trial. HUD's threat-on top of the city and county claims-was meant to promote a settlement, not a trial.
20
No doubt, with a piddling $1.5 billion in annual revenues, 21 gun makers are not going to yield the same treasure trove as the tobacco behemoths whose worldwide sales are $300 billion.
22
A comparatively small payoff is not fatal, however. The real goal of the trial lawyers is to chalk up one more victory, thus demonstrating to future fatter-cat defendants that groundless legal theories are good enough when the coercive power of multiple government entities is arrayed against an unpopular industry.
When a private lawyer subcontracts his services to the government, he bears the same responsibility as a government lawyer.
23
He is a public servant beholden to all citizens, including the defendant, and his overriding objective is to seek justice. Imagine a state attorney paid a contingency fee for each indict- 19 See, e.g., Kimmelman, supra note 18, at 13 (stating that Kairys, among others, was urged by civic leaders and Philadelphia's mayor to develop a lawsuit against gun manufactures on behalf of the city); Stuart Taylor, Jr., Guns and Tobacco: Government by Litigation, NAT'L J., Mar. 25, 2000 WYO. LAW. 14, 14 (2000) (arguing that government lawyers, including those contracted to represent the government, are bound by the same ethical standards as lawyers in private practice). ment that he secures, or a state trooper paid per speeding ticket. The potential for corruption is enormous. Still, the states doled out multi-billion dollar contracts to private counsel in their tobacco suits.
24
Those contracts did not call for per-hour fees, which might occasionally be justified to acquire unique outside competence or experience, but contingency fees, a sure-fire catalyst for abuse of power. 25 Moreover, the contracts were awarded without competitive bidding to lawyers who often bankrolled state political campaigns.
26
Put bluntly, contingency fee contracts between government and a private attorney should be illegal. We cannot in a free society condone private lawyers enforcing public law with an incentive kicker to increase the penalties.
Government is the single entity authorized, in narrowly defined circumstances, to wield coercive power against private citizens. When that government functions as prosecutor or plaintiff in a legal proceeding in which it also dispenses punishment, adequate safeguards against state misbehavior are essential. For that reason, we rely primarily on private remedies with redress sought by and for the benefit of the injured party and not the state in civil litigation. As the Supreme Court cautioned more than sixty years ago, an attorney for the state "is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its ob- 24 See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (discussing these multibillion dollar contracts to private counsel).
25
Plaintiffs' lawyers hired by the state have an inherent conflict. Because they represent the state, their goal should be to seek justice. Because they may potentially receive a huge payoff due to the contingency arrangement, plaintiffs' attorneys cannot impartially evaluate a settlement agreement. Additionally, there is little justification for states to pay large contingency fees to those attorneys when states have salaried attorneys on staff. See Levy, Tobacco Medicaid Litigation, supra note 6; see also Carolyn Lochhead, The Growing Power of Trial Lawyers, WKLY. STANDARD, Sept. 23, 1996 , at 21 (arguing that, because trial lawyers are "bankrolling politicians at a level unmatched by any profession," there exists a "blatant conflict of interest [inasmuch as] a number of state prosecutors are handing out these multibillion-dollar contracts . . . to the same lawyers who donate money to their campaigns").
26
See Lochhead, supra note 25, at 21. JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY ligation to govern at all." 27 Third, and perhaps most important, laws are supposed to be enacted by legislatures, not by the executive or judicial branches.
28
In too many instances, government-sponsored litigation has been a substitute for failed legislation. That process violates the principle of separation of powers-a centerpiece of the federal constitution and no less important at the state level.
29
Evidently, some attorneys general, mayors, and their allies in the private bar are not concerned with that violation. In an attempt to circumvent the legislative process, they intend to pursue through litigation what was rejected by the legislature.
An interesting contrast can be drawn between legal perspectives on product prohibition prevailing in 1919 and those prevailing now. § 21-22 (1984) (noting that the right to regulate or prohibit the sale or manufacture of alcoholic beverages rested exclusively in the states prior to the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution). 31 U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. " [T] he manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited." Id.
32
See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 844 (making simple possession of controlled substances unlawful and establishing penalties); 21 U.S.C. § 841 (making manufacture, distribution and dispensing controlled substances or intent to do so unlawful and establishing penalties); 21 U.S.C. § 878 (giving Drug Enforcement Administration personnel and certain state and local law enforcement officers power to conduct searches, seize controlled substances, and it came to tobacco, the Clinton administration argued not only do we not need a constitutional amendment, we also do not need a statute. 33 Instead, according to the administration, we only need a delegation of some sort to an unelected administrative agency, the Food and Drug Administration, with authority to ban nicotine.
34
And in the case of guns, some feel that we do not need a constitutional amendment, a statute, or a delegation. Instead, we only need multiple lawsuits as a means for the executive branch to bypass the legislature and effectuate a variety of gun prohibitions.
35
So much for limited government and separation of powers. We are left with the executive state-a modern-day return of the king.
Under that regime, dozens of cities, aided by the Clinton administration, took the gun battle to the courts-suing gun makers for "negligently marketing" a "defective product."
36
Before further discussing those lawsuits, however, a quick but important detour-an examination of the debate surrounding the Second Amendment-is warranted.
II. TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS
At the same time that cities were suing the gun industry, a Texas appeals court was reviewing a lower court decision that make arrests). 33 See Cable News Network, President Declares Nicotine Addictive (Aug. 23, 1996) U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people to peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. " Id. 40 U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. Id. tect the state, but each individual against the state-that is, the amendment is a deterrent to government tyranny.
Perhaps so. Tyranny may be a lesser threat now, but incompetence by the state in defending its citizens against criminals is a greater threat. The demand for police to defend us increases in proportion to our inability to defend ourselves. For that reason, disarmed societies tend to become police states. Witness law abiding inner city residents, many of whom have been disarmed by gun control, begging for police protection against drug gangs despite the terrible violations of civil liberties that such protection entails, such as curfews, anti-loitering laws, civil asset forfeiture, even nonconsensual searches of public housing.
Even if a reduced threat of government tyranny were to no longer require an armed citizenry, an unarmed citizenry could well create the conditions that lead to tyranny. The right to bear arms is thus prophylactic rather than remedial. It reduces the demand for a police state. George Washington University law professor Robert Cottrol puts it this way: "A people incapable of protecting themselves will lose their rights as a free people, be- by the 1934 Act-weapons like machine guns and silencers, which have slight value to law abiding citizens, and high value to criminals. 49 Apparently, a few renowned, liberal law professors are now taking that position. In a famous 1989 article, "The Embarrassing Second Amendment," Professor Sanford Levinson became the first prominent liberal to acknowledge that the Second Amendment should be treated as something more than an inkblot.
50
Evidently, the liberal apostasy has caught on. Harvard professor Laurence Tribe and Yale professor Akhil Amar concede that there is an individual right to keep and bear arms, albeit limited as in Miller by "reasonable regulation in the interest of public safety."
51
In effect, those scholars argue that the Second Amendment, like the First Amendment, is not absolute.
52
"Reasonable" restrictions-for example, on the types of weapons that can be purchased-may be justified on cost-benefit grounds. On the other hand, Tribe and Amar imply that the Fourteenth Amendment binds the states, not just the federal government, to honor the Second Amendment.
53
In that respect, the two professors go farther than our federal appellate courts, which have taken a states rights approach to the Second Amendment, rubber-stamping state gun prohibitions without subjecting them to rigorous constitu- Id. at 31 ("[I]t has been a terrible mistake for both sides in the gun control controversy to insist that the Second Amendment bans virtually everything or virtually nothing.").
Id. (stating that the Fourth Amendment, "which makes part of the Bill of Rights applicable to the states, reflect[s] a broad agreement that bearing arms was a 'privilege' of each citizen"). JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY tional scrutiny.
54
That difference between federal and state treatment is important in repudiating an argument frequently raised by anti-gun advocates-that the framers did not intend the Second Amendment to bestow individual rights. For example, the Center to Prevent Handgun Violence argues that when our nation was founded, many states had communal storage of guns and restricted their use to white males only.
55
Pointing to the facts that Maryland actually seized guns that were not used in the militia and Pennsylvania denied firearms to 40% of its citizens for lack of virtue, the Center concludes that the framers could not have intended an individual right to keep and bear arms.
56
That argument, however, has a missing link. Until 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, the Bill of Rights constrained only the federal government. What the states did prior to that time is not directly relevant from a constitutional perspective.
With that See, e.g., Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98, 103 (9th Cir. 1996) (dismissing plaintiff's Second Amendment challenge to California's concealed firearm statute for lack of standing and declining to discuss the merits of the underlying case); Quilici v. Martin Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 269-70 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that any restriction the Second Amendment may place on the federal government does not apply to the states). No. 99-10331, 2001 WL 1230757, at *7 (5th Cir. Oct. 16, 2001 ).
58
Id. at 601-02. Here, the court rejects the notion that the framers had a "collective rights" purpose in mind when drafting the Second Amendment.
scholarly opinion said that the Constitution "protects the right of individuals, including those not then actually a member of any militia or engaged in active military service or training, to privately possess or bear their own firearms . . . that are suitable as personal individual weapons."
59
In Texas, like many other states, spouses involved in divorce proceedings can be placed under a court order restraining them from harassing, stalking, or threatening their partner.
60
A federal statute makes it illegal for anyone under that type of restraining order to possess a gun. Specifically, in observing the "plain language" of the amendment, the court finds that textually, "if the amendment truly meant what collective rights advocates propose, then the text would read, 'a well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state and the right of the States to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.'" Id. at 601 (alteration in original). Further, in its historical analysis of the Second Amendment, the court states that the individual right to bear arms was "a right recognized in both England and the colonies," and was a "crucial factor in the colonists' victory over the British army in the Revolutionary War." Id. at 603. After declaring independence and establishing a new government through the Constitution, the "American founders sought to codify the individual right to bear arms, as did their forbears one hundred years earlier in the English Bill of rights." Id.
59
Id. at 37. (9) (2001). The statute provides that it is unlawful for any person who is subject to a court order restraining "such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner of such person or child of such intimate partner or person, or engaging in other conduct that would place an intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child" to possess any firearm or ammunition. Id. A states' rights approach would also suggest that "Supreme Court decisions recognizing that the federal government has final authority over the deployment and use of the National Guard must be incorrect."
66
When Cummings parsed the two clauses of the Second Amendment, he concluded that " [t] he function of the subordinate clause was not to qualify the right, but instead to show why it must be protected. . . . If this right were not protected, the existence of the militia, and consequently the security of the state, would be jeopardized." 67 In other words, the second clause ("the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed") is operational; it secures the right. The first clause ("A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State") is explanatory; it justifies the right. That syntax was not unusual for the times. For example, the free press clause of the 1842 Rhode Island Constitution states: "The liberty of the press being essential to the security of freedom in a state, any person may publish his sentiments of any subject." 68 That provision surely does not mean that the right to publish protects only the press. It protects "any person," and one reason that it protects any person is that a free press is essential to a free society. In a similar vein, Article I, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to grant copyrights in order to "Promote progress of Science and useful Arts." 69 Yet copyrights are also granted to Hustler magazine, to racist publications, even to literature that expressly seeks to retard science and the useful arts.
70
The proper understanding of the copyright provision is that promoting science and the arts is but one justification for the copyright power. 71 Analogously, the militia clause helps explain why we have a right to bear arms, but it is not necessary to the exercise of that right.
72
As one might guess, the Clinton administration took a different position as illustrated in the following exchange at the oral argument before the Fifth Circuit in the Meteja later explained that even Guard members are only protected by the Second Amendment when and to the extent that their weapon is used for Guard business.
74
That view cannot be reconciled with the text of the Second Amendment, construed strictly in accordance with its original meaning. The term "well-regulated," in its eighteenth century context, does not mean heavily regulated, but properly regulated. Looked at in that manner, the Second Amendment ensures that the militia would not be improperly regulated, even weakened, by disarming the citizens who would be its soldiers. 75 Bear in mind that Article I, section 8 gives Congress, not the states, the power to call forth and "provide for organizing, arming . . . disciplining . . . and for governing" the militia.
76
State powers are limited to appointing officers and training. The framers feared and distrusted standing armies; so they provided for a federal militia-all able-bodied males over the age of seventeenas a counterweight against potential tyranny.
77
But the framers also realized, in granting Congress near-plenary power over the militia, that a select, armed militia subset like today's National Guard could be equivalent to a standing army. 1787 , at 330-31, 380-81, 384-88 (Max Ferrand ed. 1966 ).
"well-regulated."
Consider also these three changes made by the 1789 Congress when it drafted the amendment. First, Congress eliminated a provision excusing conscientious objectors from military service, making it clear that the Second Amendment is about firearms, not about military service. 79 Second, it stripped the term "wellarmed" as a modifier of "militia," again clarifying that the arms belonged to the people, not the military. 80 Third, it dropped the phrase "for the common defense" after the words "to keep and bear arms."
81
Here there is no ambiguity; the intent was to provide an individual right of defense, not common defense.
Finally, consider three other constitutional arguments against gun control, apart from the Second Amendment. First, many gun regulations are too vague and thus do not provide citizens with adequate notice of the particular acts that are illegal. examine the federal government claims, which the Bush administration will probably not pursue. Next, we consider litigation by more than thirty cities and counties as well as New York State.
A. Federal Claims
At the federal level, Clinton's HUD secretary, Andrew Cuomo, had a plan to change the way the nation's gun makers do business.
86
He advocated legal action by each of 3400 housing authorities in an attempt to hold gun makers responsible for defraying the cost of security guards and alarm systems installed to curb violence in public housing.
87
Like the cities, HUD said it was not interested in money damages.
88
While that may have been the case, Cuomo and his acolytes understood very well that the small gun industry could not afford to defend itself-even against unfounded suits-in the face of such overwhelming firepower. Already smothered by litigation from dozens of cities and counties, the gun industry would have been crushed under the weight of such action. A Wall Street Journal story emphasized that very point:
As with the municipal suits, one filed on behalf of housing authorities would be groundbreaking and certainly not a sure bet to succeed in court. Cuomo's efforts, in essence, were no better than thinly veiled blackmail.
In justifying HUD's litigation plans, Cuomo contended that "only one percent of the dealers are selling over 50 percent of the guns used in crimes." 90 If, however, crimes were linked to guns sold by particular dealers, there is no reason why the underlying data was not turned over to authorities. It is, in fact, the authorities' duty to shut down dealers who break laws on the books in all fifty states. Instead, Cuomo sought to compel gun makers to become police, judge, and jury. He expected such makers to ferret out "bad" dealers-some of whom were entirely innocentand to deny those dealers, without due process of law, the merchandise that they sell for a living.
In addition, Cuomo also demanded safer guns.
92
"We have safety caps on aspirin," he has stated, so why not safety locks on guns?
93
That flawed logic, however, overlooks relevant differences between guns and aspirin. First, the requirement for safety caps on aspirin arose out of legislation, not judicial mandate. Dec. 15, 1999 , at A12 (noting that the aim of HUD Secretary Andrew Cuomo and Bruce Reed, President Clinton's point man on gun policy, "would be to force manufacturers to produce safer guns and new business practices to guard against shady dealers"). people when confronted with an emergency will turn to a bottle of aspirin for protection. Use of a gun for self-defense could be dangerously compromised if the gun is locked. Sammy "The Bull" Gravano, the Mafia turncoat, aptly stated, "Safety locks? You . . . pull the trigger with a lock on, and I'll pull the trigger [without one]. We'll see who wins."
95
If Cuomo was so concerned about unsafe public housing, he should have sued his own agency. HUD is responsible for housing authorities-including their location, selection of tenants, eviction policies, even inadequate policing. But rather than admit to the abject failure of public housing, 96 Cuomo instructed his minions to plan lawsuits, modeled after those filed by cities and counties from coast to coast. Those baseless lawsuits embody two principal legal theories: negligent marketing and defective products.
B. Negligent Marketing
The city of Chicago, and other cities following its example, accused gun makers of "negligent marketing"-flooding the suburbs where gun laws are relaxed with more guns than suburban residents will buy, knowing that the excess will find its way to the inner city, where gun laws are more restrictive.
97
Simple economic logic reveals the flaw in Chicago's negligent marketing claim. If gun makers reduce the supply of firearms sold to suburban dealers, the market price of guns will rise. Consumers with the most "elastic" demand-that is, consumers who are most sensitive to price changes-will reduce or eliminate their purchases. The evidence is clear that those price-sensitive 95 Howard Blum, Reluctant Don, VANITY FAIR, Sept. 1999, at 165. 96 HUD, under Cuomo's command, failed to screen tenants, fix elevators, and provide policing. See Richard A. Epstein, Lawsuits Aimed at Guns Probably Won't Hit Crime, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 1999, at A26. Considering guns to be the major problem, HUD focused on suits against manufacturers, and, as a result, overlooked vital steps leading to a severe decline in the state of housing projects. Id.

See supra note 4 (listing suits filed by counties). JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
consumers are typically law-abiding citizens.
98
By contrast, criminals' demand for guns is highly "inelastic." They operate in a "survival at any price" environment, which is why crooks are willing to pay inflated black-market prices for firearms. Perversely, by restricting the legal supply of guns and raising prices, manufacturers will put relatively more weapons in criminals' hands and relatively fewer in the hands of honest citizens.
Besides, any coordinated industry response to a negligent marketing claim would run afoul of the antitrust laws. Manufacturers that supposedly overproduce would have to collude in order to reduce production jointly. Although Smith & Wesson is aware of how many of its guns are going to, for instance, Maryland, those guns, by themselves, do not saturate the Maryland market. Smith & Wesson has no idea how many Maryland guns are shipped by Colt, Beretta, Glock, Ruger, or any other manufacturer. Because brands are more or less interchangeable, no single gun maker would agree to cut back production for fear that other manufacturers would simply take up the slack. Yet if the companies were to collude, an antitrust lawsuit would surely ensue.
An obvious solution to Chicago's problem, said the judge who dismissed the city's case this past September, would be for the police to enforce laws that already prohibit sales to minors, felons, the mentally incompetent, and anyone else without a stateissued firearm owners ID card. 99 Instead, Chicago sued gun makers lawfully selling to wholesalers, who, in turn, sell to licensed retailers. The city wanted to hold gun makers liable for the violent acts of criminals; however, most of these criminals-over whom the manufacturer has no control-did not buy from licensed retailers. As of April 2000, seventeen months after Chicago filed its lawsuit, only four of the retailers targeted by the city's undercover "stings" had been charged.
106
In the only case to go to trial, the jury took but ten minutes to find the defendant not guilty.
107
If the behavior of those dealers was as egregious as the city's complaint suggests, why were there only four indictments and zero convictions? Nationwide, thousands of laws regulate everything from who can own a gun and how it can be purchased to where one can possess or use it. 108 Nonetheless, in 1998 there were only eight federal prosecutions for the thousands of instances that guns were brought illegally onto school grounds.
109
According to a Syracuse University study, from 1992 to 1999, federal gun prosecutions declined by 43%.
110
Over the two years ended mid-1999, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms ("BATF") traced half of the guns used in crimes to 389 dealers, but only nineteen had 105 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(a) (2) Kopel & Gardiner, supra note 65, Handguns are the only consumer product that an American consumer is forbidden to purchase outside his state of residence. They are the only mass consumer product for which retailers, wholesalers, and manufacturers all require federal licenses. They are among a tiny handful of consumer products for which the federal government regulates simple possession, and further regulates the terms of retail transactions, going so far as to require (for handguns) that police be notified and given an opportunity to disapprove the sale before being allowed to consummate the transaction. Kopel & Gardiner, supra Moreover, a BATF study released in June 2000 documented 1,700 federal and state gun-law prosecutions and 1,000 verdicts from July 1996 through December 1998.
112
On a per-year basis, that equals 680 prosecutions and 400 guilty pleas-trivial numbers when contrasted with roughly 500,000 gun crimes committed in the United States each year.
The effect of more rigorous law enforcement and stiffer penalties is apparent from Richmond's experience with Project Exile 113 -a federal program that, in part, mandates a five-year minimum sentence in federal prison for any felon caught carrying or trying to buy a gun.
114
As a result of the program, Richmond reported a 36% decline in gun homicides and 37% drop in armed robberies for the 1997 calendar year.
115
When the National Rifle Association ("NRA") sought to expand Project Exile, it received little support from the Clinton administration until September 1999, at which time the president requested an inconsequential budget increase of $5 million. Developed in 1997 by the U.S. Attorney's Office in Richmond, "Project Exile" facilitated the prosecution of illegal gun offenses in federal court, created stiffer bond rules and sentencing guidelines, expedited the reporting system, and decreased processing time for felons with gun charges associated with domestic violence. In addition, the program improved police officer training on federal firearms statutes and search and seizure issues. It would be far better for the states to stiffen their own penalties than to federalize yet more crimes.
119
Indeed, the federalization of most gun crimes cannot be squared with the Tenth Amendment, which permits the federal government to exercise only those powers that are enumerated in the Constitution and delegated by it to the United States. 120 Still, many federal criminal laws would qualify as a legitimate exercise of state police power. In any event, non-enforcement-whether state or federal-cannot be laid at the doorstep of gun makers.
Naturally, if existing laws are not being enforced, the best bet, according to the politicians, is to pass more laws. In the Chicago suburbs, for example, the Cook County legislature could have enacted more restrictive gun laws. For whatever reasons, it chose not to do so. Instead, Cook County signed on as coplaintiff in Chicago's lawsuit to do what the county elected not to. In effect, Cook County's complaint to the court, quite literally, is that the county has itself failed to pass appropriate legislation.
C. Defective Product
Apart from negligent marketing, the second major claim among cities suing the gun industry is that firearms are "defective and unreasonably dangerous" as they are currently manufactured.
121
In order to hold gun makers liable for selling an unsafe 117 Id.
118
Id. Jan. 24, 1999 , at H3 (discussing New Orleans' suit against fifteen gun manufacturers, whereby the city sought damages based on the sales of guns that were unreasonably dangerous because "they did not incorporate recognition technologies that would prevent their use by children or by anyone other than the owner").
122
See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 (1998) ("[P]roducts are not generically defective merely because they are dangerous.").
123
Editorial, Guns in Court, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 1999, at A18. 124 975 F. Supp. 370, 381 (D. Mass. 1996) . JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY an anti-theft safety mechanism as part of the design of handguns requires a balancing of the risk and utility. . . . Plaintiffs have not shown that such a device is available, nor have they asserted the possibility of showing at trial that such a device would satisfy the . . . risk-utility test.
125
Weinstein added that "[t]he mere act of manufacturing and selling a handgun does not give rise to liability absent a defect in the manufacture or design of the product itself."
126
If guns are inherently defective, then New Orleans and other cities that have swap programs bring their suits under a cloud of hypocrisy. In 1998 the New Orleans Police Department traded more than 8,000 confiscated weapons-40% of which were semiautomatic-to a commercial dealer in return for Glocks.
127
Nearly half of the traded guns would have been characterized as "unsafe" in the city's own lawsuit against gun makers-including TEC9s, 
Id.
127
See Matt Labash, Lawyers, Guns, and Money, WEEKLY STANDARD, Feb. 1, 1999, at 25-29. 128 A TEC9 is an inexpensive auto-loaded assault pistol manufactured by Intratec Firearms. See Firearm Information by Type, at http://recguns.com/ IIIC2jl.html. Although not a fully automatic firearm, it looks like a miniature submachine gun and features a threaded barrel and a thirty-round magazine.
Id.
129
An AK47 is a military assault rifle designed in 1947 by Russian General Mikhail Kalashnikov. See The AK47 Page, at http://members.tripod.com/ sa93/ak47.html. It is a cheaply manufactured lightweight automatic weapon. Id. The AK-47 was the weapon of choice for the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries. Id.
130
The Uzi is a compact automatic weapon designed by Uziel Gal, an officer in the Israeli Army. Uzi Submachine Gun, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, available at http://www.britannica.com. Law enforcement personnel and members of the Special Forces use it widely. Id. The weapon's design is based on earlier Czech designs, "in which bullets were fed into the gun's chamber from a box shaped magazine inserted into the pistol. . . . " Id. guns across the nation. 131 Ironically, New Orleans could end up as defendant in other cities' suits.
Under pressure, Morial suspended the swap program.
132 But New Orleans was not the only hypocritical plaintiff. Police departments in Boston, Detroit, Oakland, Miami, St. Louis, and Bridgeport have also traded-in "unsafe" guns, which are now back on the street, even while suing gun makers for marketing a defective product.
133
Undoubtedly sensitive to the bad publicity, several police departments announced they that would explore lease programs, rather than trade-in programs, with Glock.
134
While such a policy might relieve the city of direct responsibility for providing unsafe guns for commercial resale, the revised contractual arrangement merely camouflages the same deal, the recycling of "defective" products for use by private citizens.
Whether the claim is a defective product or negligent marketing, these lawsuits are baseless. Only five of them have reached final judgment and all five were fully or partially dismissed.
135
For example in October 1999, an Ohio state judge threw out Cincinnati's claims, holding that gun makers are not responsible for the criminal misconduct of customers. "The city's complaint is an improper attempt to have this court substitute its judgment for that of the legislature," the judge explained.
136
The suits in 131 See Labash, supra note 127, at 25-29. 132 See Jake Tapper, City Slickers, SALON NEWS, July 13, 1999 at 25-29. Court Rejects Cincinnati Suit Against Gun Industry, REUTERS, Oct. 7, JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY Bridgeport and Miami were also dismissed in December 1999. Miami's judge observed that the city could not use the courts to regulate because that is the job of the legislature.
137
A Florida appeals court upheld the Miami ruling, calling the lawsuit "an attempt to regulate firearms . . . through the . . . judiciary." 138 "Clearly this round-about attempt is being made because of the County's frustration at its inability to regulate firearms," the appeals court wrote. "The County's frustration cannot be alleviated through litigation."
139
On September 15, 2000, a judge threw out Chicago's negligent marketing claim saying that statistical evidence of causation was insufficient, and that individual instances of illegal sales were a matter for the police to counter.
140
Most recently, on December 21, 2000, a federal judge dismissed Philadelphia's claims, describing the city's charge of public nuisance as "a theory in search of a case," and rejecting the negligence claim "for lack of proximate cause." 141 Nevertheless, the trial lawyers press forward. Sooner or later they will likely find a sympathetic judge who is willing to ignore the law in order to effectuate his personal policy preferences. Such forum shopping is a favorite tactic of the plaintiffs' bar. In fact, the major reason each city has sued its local dealers as well as gun manufacturers is so that a plaintiff and at least one defendant reside in the same jurisdiction. In that way, the case cannot be removed to federal court, where the rule of law generally prevails-outweighing provincial prejudices.
While the search for friendly forums moves ahead, pending lawsuits are having predictable effects. Smaller gun makers are going out of business. For example, two California dealers have declared bankruptcy. Colt announced a layoff of 300 workers and said it would withdraw from the consumer handgun business, focusing instead on military weapons and collectibles.
142
Prospective litigation costs are showing up in higher gun prices. Top quality handguns are now priced in the $350 to $550 range, and fewer guns are available for less than $100. Those higher prices have less impact on criminal demand than on the demand from price-sensitive, law-abiding, especially inner-city citizens.
D. Smith & Wesson Settlement
On a parallel track, threatened litigation by the federal government and actual litigation by dozens of cities were used as a bludgeon to force the industry's largest manufacturer, Smith & Wesson, into a settlement. Despite countervailing pressure from its customers and other gun makers, Smith & Wesson threw in the towel-explaining that $100 million or more in damages, sought by several of the larger cities, exceeded the company's profits for the entire past decade.
143
Moreover, the company protested, it cost $1 million to defend against each governmentsponsored claim. In return, the gun maker pledged, first, to impose a number of restrictions on its dealers and distributors: (a) No sales of any manufacturer's guns unless the buyer has passed a safety course and cleared a background check-even if the check takes longer than the three-day period required by law; (b) no sales at any gun shows unless all sales at the show are subject to a background check; Second, Smith & Wesson agreed to childproof all of its handguns within a year, presumably by using features like a heavier trigger pull or a magazine disconnect, which prevent a gun from firing once the magazine is removed. Under terms of the settlement, every Smith & Wesson handgun would also be equipped with an external lock within sixty days and an internal lock within twenty-four months. Fourth (reminiscent of the tobacco settlement that forced manufacturers to fund anti-smoking programs), Smith & Wesson promised to "work together to support legislative efforts to reduce firearm misuse" and contribute 1% of its revenue toward an "education trust fund" to inform the public about the risk of firearms. 153 An Oversight Committee in each settling citycomprised of one Smith & Wesson official and one representative each from the city, county, state, and federal government-was set to monitor and supervise all provisions of the settlement.
154
Those terms and conditions obscure what is actually driving the settlement. From the government's perspective, the settlement was a means to bypass state and federal legislatures that had been singularly unresponsive to a variety of gun control proposals. Moreover, the settlement circumvents court review in many jurisdictions. Judicial approval would be required only in jurisdictions where lawsuits had already been filed and were to be dismissed as a condition of the settlement. That excludes the suits threatened but not filed by HUD and various cities and states.
To sweeten the deal further, President Clinton sought to assemble the Communities for Safer Guns Coalition, an alliance of local governments, along with HUD, that would refrain from buying police firearms manufactured by any company that did not sign the settlement. With a change in administration, the settlement probably will not attract other gun makers as co-signers, nor is the settlement likely to benefit Smith & Wesson, which announced this past June that it was closing two of its plants for a month, partly due to adverse customer reaction. tutional right of the gun makers to engage in trade.
161
The plaintiffs asked a federal court to forbid new gun regulations that were not authorized by Congress.
162
By August 2000, however, it was apparent that the buying preferences had not materialized. Police departments, for obvious reasons, wanted the best weapons available. Even HUD bought guns from Glock, 163 which did not sign the settlement yet continued to supply roughly two-thirds of police weapons nationally. 164 In January 2001, NSSF and the seven gun makers dropped their suit. 165 On another front, to intensify the pressure for a settlement, Cuomo, Spitzer, and Blumenthal threatened an antitrust suit against Smith & Wesson's rivals for organizing a boycott against that company's products. Blumenthal issued subpoenas for documents, despite no "solid evidence" other than a post-settlement industry meeting attended by a number of gun makers, who expressed criticism of Smith & Wesson and the settlement.
166
Spitzer pulled no punches. The goal, he gloated, was to "squeeze [gun] manufacturers like a pincers," 167 proving once again that unprincipled politicians are more than willing to use the antitrust laws as a club to force conformity by companies that refuse to play ball. Data shows that Dodge City was actually safer than today's Washington, D.C., which has the highest gun murder rate in the United States, accompanied by the strictest gun control.
IV. GUNS, CRIME AND ACCIDENTS
178
Is that because guns are readily available in nearby Virginia? Why then is the D.C. murder rate fifty-seven per 100,000 while the murder rate in Arlington, Virginia, an urban community just across the river, is only 1.6 per 100,000?
179
In D.C., social pathologieslike illegitimacy, unemployment, dysfunctional schools, and substance abuse-promote crime while in Virginia guns deter crime.
In reality, less than 5% of the population takes out concealed handgun permits.
180
The rest of us benefit because the criminals do not know which 5% are armed. Laws permitting the carrying of concealed handguns reduce murder by about 8% and rape by about 5%.
181
Police carry guns; mayors and bodyguards carry guns; why not law-abiding residents of high crime areas?
In May 1998, the House of Representatives passed-by voice vote with almost no debate-a bill permitting federal judges (including bankruptcy judges and even some retired judges) to carry 2 (2000) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-47-8 (2000) . 176 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-3302 (Michie 2000) That high gun ownership is the cause of the high murder rate in the United States is a myth. Comparable statistics from other countries demonstrate that there is no correlation between high gun ownership and high murder rates. In Switzerland, Finland, and New Zealand, roughly the same percentage of the population owns guns as in the U.S., but we have a far higher murder rate.
184
In Israel, moreover, gun ownership is 40% above the U.S. rate, but the murder rate is far lower.
185
Further foreign statistics demonstrate that disarming a population leads to increased crime rates. In Australia, for example, the population was disarmed in 1998. 186 Since then, homicides are up 3.2%, assaults up 8.6%, and armed robberies up 44%. 187 For twenty-five years prior, armed robberies and homicides committed with firearms had declined. 188 have prevented horrific crimes through the use of firearms. An armed gun-store employee in Santa Clara, California shot a customer who had threatened to kill three others.
189
Armed citizens prevented massacres in Anniston, Alabama, Pearl, Mississippi, and Edinboro, Pennsylvania. 190 Yet the response of some politicians is to disarm those very same citizens.
Gun control advocates reject the well-supported argument that guns deter crime. Instead, they point to a study by Arthur Kellerman, who concluded that families possessing a gun are twentytwo times more likely to kill other family members or acquaintances than to kill in self-defense. 191 But what is not factored into the Kellerman equation is the fact that a gun is rarely fired in a self-defense scenario; the value of the gun in such an instance is to deter, not kill.
192
Moreover, 85% of the deaths that Kellerman cites are suicides.
193
He explains that suicides are five times more likely if there is a gun in the home. 194 Kellerman, however, has the causal relationship exactly backwards. Gun possession does not lead someone to commit suicide; instead, emotionally disturbed people acquire guns precisely because they intend, or may be psychologically prone, to commit suicide.
195
Again conflating cause and effect, Kellerman notes that a handgun in the home raises the risk of death by 3.4 times. See Barrett, In Gun Debate, supra note 191, at B1. 195 See Barrett, In Gun Debate, supra note 191, at B1. 196 See David B. Kopel, Guns, Germs, and Science: Public Health Approaches to Gun Control, 84 J. MED. ASS'N GA. 269, 271 (June 1995) . 197 See Don B. Kates, et al., Guns and Public Health: Epidemic of Vio-might decide to put iron bars on his store windows if the store was located in a high crime area. Surely, no one would suggest that the store would be safer if it removed the bars. Nor would a family in a high risk inner city environment be safer if it relinquished its handgun. The gun, like the bars, serves to safeguard lives and property.
The important point to remember is that each individual could well be the sole means of his own defense. Kopel and Gardiner make the point as follows:
Governments are immune from suit for failure-even grossly negligent or deliberate failure-to protect citizens from crime. Similarly, governments are immune from suit for injuries inflicted by criminals who were given early release on parole. Accordingly, it would be highly inappropriate for the government, through the courts, to make it . . . impossible for persons to own handguns for selfdefense because, supposedly, ordinary Americans are too stupid and clumsy to use them effectively. If the Judiciary will not question the government's civil immunity for failure to protect people, the courts certainly should not let themselves become a vehicle that deprives people of the tools they need to protect themselves. 198 cidents.
212
That decline has been confirmed by data from the U.S. Department of Education indicating that expulsions for bringing firearms to school during the academic year 1997-98 were onethird less than the prior year.
213
Out of more than 32,000 gunrelated deaths, only 630 were kids under fifteen. Of those, 142 were accidental. 214 Predictably, that good news was met by an outcry from the Washington Post: Safety locks will "reduce this country's horrifying accidental-gun-death rate of children under 15." 215 While some may find those statistics horrifying, more kids under fifteen are killed by bikes, swimming pools and cigarette lighters than by gun accidents.
216
Will our city mayors be pursuing each of those industries? If gun manufacturers are responsible for violence, why not the makers of the steel used in the guns? Indeed, when an Ohio appellate judge upheld the dismissal of Cincinnati's gun suit in August 2000, he wrote the following: "Were we to decide otherwise, we would open a Pandora's box. The city could sue the manufacturers of matches for arson, or automobile manufacturers for traffic accidents, or breweries for drunken driving."
217
If anything, the case for holding car makers liable for drunk driving accidents is stronger than the case for charging gun makers for gun-related injuries. "In contrast to gun dealers, automobile [manufacturers] make no effort at all to ensure that the buyer is not a criminal. Nor do automobile manufacturers require that their dealers take even minimal steps to check if a prospective 212 See June Kronholz, School Firearm Expulsions Dropped in '97-'98, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 1999, at A4. 213 Kronholz, supra note 212, at A4. Moreover, "automobile manufacturers have much more ability than gun manufacturers to control dealer behavior, since most automobile manufacturers have exclusive, direct relationships with dealers. In contrast, the majority of gun dealers purchase inventory from wholesalers" without any reliable means to track retail purchases. 219 
CONCLUSION
Before we compromise the Constitution, undermining the principles of federalism and separation of powers, and violating rights recognized expressly in the Second Amendment and implicitly in the Ninth, we ought to be sure of three things: First, that we've identified the real problem; second, that we have pinpointed its cause; and third, that our fix is less intrusive than alternative fixes. The spreading litigation against gun makers fails all three tests. Guns do not increase violence-they reduce violence. Banning or regulating firearms will not eliminate the underlying social pathologies that cause violence. Moreover, a less intrusive remedy already exists-the enforcement of existing laws.
There is a lesson to be learned from all of this. If nothing is done to rein in baseless, government-sponsored lawsuits, private attorneys and their accomplices in the public sector will continue to invent legal theories to exact tribute from friendless industries. In the latest rounds of litigation, law-abiding gun manufacturers may be forced to pay for the actions of criminals. That outcome will likely entice politicians unwilling to make tough choices and will enrich trial lawyers. There can be no pretense, however, that litigation of that sort has any basis at all in the rule of law.
The American public-especially voters and jurors-must be warned that our tort system is rapidly becoming a tool for extortion by a coterie of politicians and trial lawyers. Sometimes they 218 Kopel & Gardiner, supra note 65, at 763. 219 Id.
seek money; sometimes they pursue policy goals; often they abuse their power. Take it from former labor secretary, Robert Reich, certainly not renowned for his opposition to imperious government. Reich tells us that his ex-boss in the White House, President Clinton, launched "lawsuits to succeed where legislation failed." 220 "The strategy may work," Reich adds, "but at the cost of making our frail democracy even weaker. . . . This is nothing short of faux legislation, which sacrifices democracy to the discretion of administration officials operating in utter secrecy."
221
Reich has it just about right. But the problem outlives the Clinton White House. It infests many of the state houses and city halls. Like most infestations, this one can be fumigated. When we condone the selective and retroactive application of extraordinary legal principles-intended specifically to transfer resources from disfavored defendants to favored plaintiffs, or even worse, to the public sector-we substitute political cronyism for fundamental fairness, profane the rule of law and debase personal freedom.
